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CURRENT LEGISLATION
The New York courts are looked to as affording an avenue for
upholding the proposed statute. There are decisions in New York
to the effect that the "yellow dog" contract is only a condition of employment-a mere understanding as distinguished from an enforceable contract. 15
However, in these cases the court found that the contract was
one at will, or that it was so full of loopholes in the Interborough
cases, that the I. R. T. could terminate the employment almost at
will, thus leaving the contract wholly without mutuality. The New
York decisions still leave open the possibility that contracts may be
drawn which will meet the requirements of mutuality and consideration. Where there was a bona fide agreement for a definite term,
no New York case went so far as to refuse an injunction. 6
Hence, the legislation will have to hurdle formidable barriers.
Professor Walsh is of the opinion that the true solution of the
whole vexing question would be a holding by the courts that inof labor
ducing a breach of such contracts to extend the organization
7
in an industry is privileged as fair competition.'
It is pointed out that nowhere in the Hitchnuan18 case were the
social implications and consequences of the enforcement of "yellow
dog" contracts through injunctions so much as mentioned. Even
so, three judges dissented, and perhaps in the next case, with the
purposes and results appearing so clearly, the Supreme Court might
depart from its prior decisions. 19
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SECTION 52-A. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAws.-The Legislature of the State of New York during the 1931 session extended

the right to obtain personal service on defendants in motor vehicle
Exchange Bakery and Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157
N. E. 130 (1927); Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65,

159 N. E. 863 (1928); cf. Interborough Rapid Transit v. Greene, 131 Misc.

682, 227 N. Y. S. 258 (1928).

The defendant's brief in this suit published by

the Workers' Education Bureau Press is deemed about the best presentation
of the legal and economic arguments against the "yellow dog" ever compiled.
I In Vail Ballan Press v. Casey, 125 Misc. 689, 212 N. Y. S. 115 (1925),
the court said: "it is illegal for any person to induce an employee to breach

his contract of employment and to discontinue the same where the contract
is still in force and has a definite time to run. The reason is that such a contract is a property right of value to an employer. The rule is different where
there is no employment for an expressed definite term because it is not the
duty of one man to work for another, unless he has agreed to, and if he has
so agreed, but for no fixed period, either may end the contract whenever he
chooses." cf. A. L. Reed Co. v. Whiteman, 238 N. Y. 545, 144 N. E. 885
(1924).
17
WALSH oN EQuiry (1930) p. 258.
'Supra note 1.
" Witte, "Yellow Dog" Contracts (1930) 6 Wis. L. Rav. 21, 30.
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accidents without actual service on such defendants within the territorial confines of the state of New York. This new section ' reads
as follows:
"The operation by a resident of a motor cycle or a
motor vehicle on a public highway in this state, or the operation on a public highway in this state of a motor vehicle
or motor cycle owned by such resident, if operated by his
consent or permission, either express or implied, shall, in
all cases where such resident shall have removed from this
state, prior to the service of legal process upon him in actions hereafter described, and shall have been therefrom
for thirty days continuously, be deemed equivalent to an
appointment by such resident of the Secretary of State to
be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served
the summons in any action against him, growing out of
any accident or collision in which such resident may be
involved while operating a motor vehicle on such a public
highway, or in which such motor vehicle or motor cycle
may be involved while being operated on such a highway
with the consent, express or implied, of such resident
owner; and such operation shall be deemed a signification
of his agreement that such summons against him which is
so served shall be of the same legal force and validity as
if served on him personally within the state. Service of
such summons shall be made in the same manner, and with
the same force and effect, as specified and set forth for
the service of a summons upon a nonresident in section
fifty-two of this chapter. The court in which the action
is pending may order such extensions as may be necessary
to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend
the action."
Prior to its enactment, Section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law provided a similar method of obtaining personal service on
non-residents. 2 It will be noted that Section 52-a applies only to
residents who leave the state andc remain away for a period of thirty
days. No difficulty should be encountered in construing this section as to its applicability to residents who leave the state with intent to establish a domicile elsewhere, since both Section 52 and
Section 52-a prescribe identical method of serving such process. It
is therefore obvious -that a defendant who leaves the state for a
period of thirty days or more must fall within the purview of either
of these two sections.
Skepticism as to the constitutionality of this section has been
'Laws of 1931, Ch. 154, effective March 27, 1931.
'Laws of 1929, Ch. 54 as amended by laws of 1930, Ch. 57, effective
March 3, 1930.
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expressed in some quarters. It is submitted that a careful analysis
of this statute together with a review of the recent expressions of
the United States Supreme Court on similar statutes of other states
and closely analogous questions will resolve this doubt. Reduced
to its lowest term this statute provides: 1. That a resident as a condition precedent to operating a motor vehicle on the public highways
of this state must appoint the Secretary of State his agent for the
purpose of accepting process if he absents himself for a period of
thirty days from the state after an accident. 2. That he likewise
appoints the Secretary of State his agent for the same purpose and
under the same conditions to accept process arising out of accidents
or collision of motor vehicles owned by him and operated with his
consent.
The increased use of motor vehicles has given rise to many
problems, especially that of obtaining jurisdiction by the courts of
a state, over non-residents and residents who seek to evade service.
The first state statute that attempted to deal with this problem and
whose validity was passed upon by the United States Supreme Court3
was enacted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This statute
provided that service might be obtained on defendants in motor
vehicle cases by serving process on a state official and mailing a
copy of the process by registered mail to the defendant and filing
the return receipt. In the case of Hess v. Pawloski 4 a judgment
obtained under this statute was attacked on the ground that it deprived defendant of his property without due process of law in contravention of the 14th Amendment. The United States Supreme
Court in sustaining this statute said:
"Motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and even
when skilfully and carefully operated their use is attended
by serious dangers to persons and property. In the public
interest the state may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all residents and non-residents alike who use its highways." r
The Court further pointed out that the requirement of notice
and opportunity to be heard was adequately satisfied by the provisions of the statute in question. One year later the Supreme Court
had occasion to pass on the constitutionality of a statute of the State
of New Jersey 6 which undertook to solve this problem. This statute
unlike the Massachusetts statute made no provision whatever for
mailing a notice to the defendant but merely required service on a
' General Laws of Massachusetts, Ch. 90 as amended by Ch. 431, Section
2, Stat. 1923.
'274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927).

r274 U. S. 356.

' Chapter 232 of Laws of 1924 (P. L. 1924, p. 517).
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state official and did not even place any duty on that official to
notify the defendant. In the case of Wuchter v. Pizzutti7 the Supreme Court decided that a judgment obtained under this statute
deprived the defendant of property without due process of law. The
rationale of this decision is that a state may provide a method whereby
a citizen may obtain an effective judgment against a non-resident or
fleeing resident in these motor vehicle cases provided that such
method include the sending of notice to the defendant and that there
is a reasonable certainty that such notice will be received. The New
York statutes dealing both with resident and non-residents have
adopted the identical language of the Massachusetts statute except
that the Massachusetts statute is limited to operators of motor
vehicles and does not extend to motor vehicles operated by others
with the consent of the owner. Thus it will readilr be seen that
there can be no question of the constitutionality of a statute which
prescribes a method of obtaining jurisdiction over a resident when
a similar statute prescribing an identical method of obtaining jurisdiction over a non-resident has been upheld by the Supreme Court.8
Therefore the only question to be considered is whether the
New York statute in so far as it includes the owner of the vehicle
when that owner is not the operator at the time of the accident, violates the Fourteenth Amendment. This question should not be
confused with Section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law 9 which
changes the substantive law of the state of New York and imputes
negligence to owners of vehicles when such vehicles are operated
with their consent and the operators have been negligent. There
is no question as to a state's right to change its substantive law in
this respect. 10 It is submitted that the reasoning that upholds the
constitutionality of these statutes as to operators is equally applicable
to the extension of these statutes to owners who are not operators.
While it does not appear that this specific question was ever passed
on by the United States Supreme Court, the courts of the State of
New York have not hesitated to sustain the right of the Legislature
to impose such conditions on owners of motor vehicles." In fact
if a different conclusion were reached, corporations would be immune from the application of these statutes. Further, since the
peril which is sought to be avoided is equally as great and as the
requirement for notice is equally as reasonable, there seems to be
no logical grounds on which the discrimination between owners
who are operators and owners who are not operators can be sustained. In an age when the ideal in the law is no longer Austin's
'276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259 (1928).

'Ibid. note 4.
'Laws
of 1929, Chapter 54.
"0 Downing v. New York, 245 N. Y. 597 (1927); Dawley v. McKibbin,
245 N. Y. 557 (1927) ; New York C. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup.
Ct. 247 (1916).
Bischoff v. Schnepp, 139 Misc. 293, 249 N. Y. S. 49 (1930).
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"Will of the Sovereign," which thought permeates and shapes our
rules for acquiring jurisdiction, but rather seems to be in the direction of cosmopolitan justice and a juridically controlled world, it
would seem that any attempt to restrict jurisdiction and defeat justice on technical grounds based upon outworn concept should be
frowned upon. It is submitted that the statute in question is sound
legislation and will be sustained when its constitutionality is passed
upon by the United States Supreme Court.
C. JOSEPii DANAHY..

